




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Cohabitation Under Mixed Electoral System in Foreign Imposed Democracy Countries “Theoretical Study” Case study; Palestinian Legislative Election 2006.

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ABSTRACT

We develop a model to explain the relationship between mixed electoral system and democracy sustained through cohabitation. This model takes in account nascent democracy as foreign imposed democracy countries. We find a strong relation between mixed electoral system and likelihood of cohabitation through analysis of Palestinian legislative election in 2006. This relation reflects the impact of both factors, Independent candidates, and polarization to big parties. The model suggests that if sustainability democracy tends to survive, more effort should be taken in this field, such as, changing institutional factors, reducing presidential power, reducing threatening of occupation, and improving consociationalism condition.

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INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian political system has been established recently after Oslo agreement between Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO) and Israeli occupied government in 1993. By this agreement, Palestinian Authority (PA) has been founded as local authority in some parts of West bank and Gaza strip (A areas) under Israeli military existence. According to Oslo agreement, PA must held election in presidential and legislative level; that is why; Palestinian democracy is considered as foreign imposed democracy, as the occupied authority is still the main and strong player in Palestinian political arena. (Lopes, 2008)

Since 1993 until now, two Legislative elections were held in Palestinian territories; the first election was in 1996, held without participation from mostly opposition parties, including Hamas, they refused Oslo agreement, so Fateh, the big authority party, was elected easily. The second one was held in 2006, when Mr Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was the president of PA; most of Palestinian opposing parties including Hamas, participated in this election. The result for 2006 election was surprising; Hamas won majority seats of Palestinian legislative council,

while Abu Mazen, chief of Fateh party was ruling as a president. In this semi-presidential political system, cohabitation had been occurred, led to gridlock and conflict between the president- from Fateh- and priminister –From Hamas-(Cavatorta and Elgie, 2009). The final result for responsibilities struggle was internal war and division between Gaza and West bank, which led to democracy collapse after one year and had second Palestinian legislative election in 2006 (Shikaki, 2002). In this research, we assume that Palestinian cohabitation occurred because of polarization of votes towards Hamas (less electoral fractionalization) is bigger than Fateh. That polarization depends on Palestinian divided society according to position regarding occupation. According to that, this research investigates the relation between mixed electoral system and cohabitation in Palestine case as occupied country. Understanding this relation will contribute in solving the problem of Palestinian democracy collapse as an expected reason for cohabitation status.

Palestinian is confused about the suitable electoral system for their nascent democracy; the first election was held in 1996 under majority election system (First Past The Post), but in the next election, this was changed after Cairo meeting in 2005,

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between Palestinian parties including Fateh and Hamas, which resulted in mixed electoral system. Mixed system in Palestine divides legislative council seats into two tiers; the first is 66 seats as plurality tier in 16 districts using "Block Vote", and the second is 66 seats as proportional seats (PR). PA was forced to change their electoral system from Plurality to proportional system in order to convince Hamas to participate in election; especially they did not even think that Hamas would win. However, Fateh took seats nearly to Hamas in proportion tier in mixed system, 28 seats for Fateh, 29 For Hamas, where the big deviation in seats was in districts level (Plurality system), 17 seats for Fateh, 45 seats for Hamas (Bjornlund, Cowan, and William Gallery, 2007).

We recognized that democracy sustainability was collapsed in Palestine because of many reasons, as occupation threatened to PA after Hamas participation, as a leader of Palestinian government. In addition of that, there are many discouragement, social and economic conditions facing nascent Palestinian democracy (Cavatorta and Elgie, 2009); nevertheless, we assume that electoral system still play a role in democracy breakdown in Palestine, because it leads to cohabitation status, which it is the core reason in political gridlock in Palestinian political system.

Duverger Law and electoral fractionalization:

Duverger law has two mainly points (Duverger, 1984):

- 1- Number of competing small parties will be less in Majority/ Plurality election. (The Psychological law on parties' level).
- 2- Voting will be less fragmented (less polarized) in Majority/ Plurality election in favour to big parties (Psychological effect on electorate).

According to this law, psychological and mechanical effect will not be occurred in majority system; neither proportional system (PR), it can occur in plurality system, where electorate do not want to waste their votes even to their preferences, when they are sure that these preferences do not have more chance to win any seat. On the other hand, parties in districts level, will not concentrate, spend effort and resources, because they believe that they have little chance to compete big parties in plurality system. Usually there is enough period should be passed until electorate and parties discover that they have no more chance to get seats in plurality system (Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). Therefore, we can expect, after number of elections, there will be more party fractionalization under PR system more than Majority/ Plurality system according to this law (Blais and Carty, 1991).

The mechanical effect, the other part of Duverger law, reflects mechanism of transforming votes to seats, as Blais, *et al.* (2011) argue. Indeed, most of the types of votes' calculating methods, like D'Hondt, Sainte-Lague are biased to big parties

against small parties. So far, by effective number of electoral parties, we can compare between these types of methods and know how they affect number and seats share of parties inside parliament. This issue is determined by how much votes got by party and will be translated to seats. This leads us to find disproportionality percentage, as important indicator for extent of electoral system bias to the big parties. As it is known, majority/ plurality system tends to put obstacles toward numbers of small parties' competing; in contrast, PR system allows more space for small parties in competing and getting seats even if their vote-share is small (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2005).

It is worth drawing attention in Duverger law that number of seats obtained by parties in districts level does not just depend on their vote-share, but also, depends on expectation of electorate (Reynolds, 1996). Nevertheless, these are not the only factors; there are other reasons, as Blaise and Carty (1991) argue; that part of these factors is relative to the number of parliament seats, district seats, ballot structure, synchronization with presidential election, and finally, the extent of federalism and political centralization. In this context, Norris (1997) argued about how district magnitude has importance to strategic voting; where he found that big district magnitude provides incentives to more players in election contest. He clarifies, also, that low electoral thresholds in each district encourage electoral player in seeking on individual votes (Norris, 1997).

There are many researches, which prove psychological and mechanical impact of Duverger law as study of Shugart (1985). Aside that, Fisher (1973) found in his early research, that small parties got numbers of votes less in district level than national level. In this context, Katz (as cited in Blais, and Carty, 1991) noticed in his study of 800 elections in 75 countries, that an average of parliamentary parties numbers in PR system was 9, single-member district (SMD) was 6. Lijphart (1999) found an average of parliamentary parties was 2 in plurality, 2.8 in majority, and 3.6 in PR. However, all of types of electoral system are biased to big parties; they give bonus of seats to big parties, but the bonus in plurality/majority system is more than PR system. Blais and Cartey (1991) confirm this relation in their study of 20 democracy elections. As Gunther (as cited in Blais, and Carty, 1991) indicated that small parties supporters hesitated to give their votes to their parties in small districts, and when threshold was high.

In contrast, Cox (1997) Criticize Duverger's law, he indicated that this law could not work in all of circumstances. Using rational model, he explained his theory about the factors, which affected electorate strategic voting; he argued that this strategic voting in Duverger law context, needed particular circumstances, through integration between incentives and preferences, time factor, accurate

information availability about chances of party's preferences and collation winning. By this view, he argued that voting in SMD might tend to small parties if one of previous factors increased (Cox, 1997).

Considering Cox criticism, Moser (1991) prove what Cox's finding. Aside that Moser and Scheiner (2004) in their study of 24-mixed electoral system in West Europe countries after communist, proved what Cox found about strategic voting. They confirmed the importance of providing information to electoral before voting, and in this relation, they found that the extent of institutionalized parties had important factor, which affected the relation between electoral system and number of parliamentary parties. In this situation, mixed electoral countries with high and strong institutionalized party system, electoral in it, will act more strategy in their voting, like Hungary and Lithuania, in contrast of countries, which had low level of institutionalized party system, like Russia.

In contrast, there are many researches could not prove Duverger law, as Ruiz & Rufino (n.d) studies of 483 parliamentary elections in 71 countries expressed. Blais, et al. (2011) could not prove Duverger law in 50% of their samples. Gschwend & Leuffen (2005) identifies four main criteria in strategic voting; effectiveness, accountability, control and dominate, and reprehensive; they find that electorate is more close to more accountability and effectiveness; they tend to vote for united government, but in contrast, electorate that is more close to representative and control, they tend to vote toward divided government. In this point, previous researches in Duverger law, did not investigate much effort into mixed electoral system as in plurality system. The main reason for that as Herron & Nishikawa (2001) argued, is that recently age of most of democracy has adopted mixed electoral system, as investigating in implementing this law needs multiple periods of elections, providing serial of electoral data elections. Nevertheless, there are some interesting studies of mixed electoral system in this field. Shugart (1985) and Fisher (1973), argue that there is Duverger law in mixed electoral systems; both find that big parties have votes in district level more than party list level; the meaning here is that there is strategic voting under Duverger law. In both of these researches, the authors study psychological effect on electoral system, not on party system. In another side, Herron & Nishikawa (2001) find Mixed-Superposition, as type of mixed electoral system, leads to different results than PR tier and plurality tier. They indicate that mechanism effect on small parties is less than in plurality system in SMD level, so they recommend, taking in accounts, contamination has effect on both tiers of mixed electoral system in future studies. Even on party system level, they argue that small parties will compete in SMD contest even if they believe that

they have little chance to win. That is why they consider this participation in SMD, as media campaign, will support them in PR contest (Herron & Nishikawa, 2001).

In contrast, Cheibub and Chernykh (2009) find that semi-presidential system usually adopts electoral system produce, which has more electoral fractionalization than in plurality system, so that reduces the chance for each party to get more than 50% of parliamentary seats, where the potential for collation government will be more likely in these systems.

Dilemma of consensus democracy under foreign imposed democracy countries:

Lijphart (1999) develops his consensus model through his previous theory "Consocialism". He argues that consensus model can be implemented in divided countries and less divided countries, he says "*The consensus model is obviously also appropriate for less divided but still heterogeneous countries, and it is a reasonable and workable alternative to the Westminster model even in fairly homogeneous countries.*" (Lijphart, 1999, p. 33)

Lijphart (1999) identifies consensus democracy as alternative type of electoral democracy as it is famous in West democracy theory named as Westminster model, he believes that "Consensus Model" provides settled democracy without political violent, and with much respectful of human and minorities rights. This Model has mainly four based points according to Lijphart (1999) theory:

- 1- Institutional factors are so important in consensus model, that they can provide strong, settled, and inclusive democratization to all groups of society. By this factor, parliamentary political system and proportional electoral system are the most favoured for consensus model.
- 2- Power sharing is the main core in consensus model, by making grand coalition, which includes minority's participation; it seems important tool for power sharing than exclusive authority in one party like Westminster model.
- 3- Fedralazim is a reasonable tool to reflect authority concentrating; indeed, less centralization means more consensus democracy.
- 4- Minority's Veto, protect minorities rights from majorities. Indeed, this point is very complicated, scholars criticized Lijphart in this point, but we can understand Lijphart theory in minority's veto as what guarantees in constitution can be given to minorities in order to protect their rights and their participation form majority.

Lijphart (1999) identifies 10 variables, which can be measured, to determine typology of political system as majority or consensus model. These variables are: 1. Concentration of executive power in one-party and bare -majority cabinets. 2. Cabinet dominance. 3. Two-party system. 4. Majoritarian and disproportional system of elections. 5. Interest group

pluralism. 6. Unitary and centralized government. 7. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature. 8. Constitutional flexibility. 9. Absence of judicial review. 10. A central bank controlled by the executive.

Indeed, Lijphart (1999) believes that his model could be the suitable model for nascent democracy states in developed countries. When we asked him about possibilities for implementing this model in Palestine as occupied countries, he totally agrees that it could be. He advised us to compare consensus model in Palestine cases with his data base of consensus variable of 36 countries, which are included in his book "Patterns of democracy" even if there are not independent countries (Lijphart, personal communication, March, 2015). However, the main point here is Lijphart's theory focuses more in institutionalized and local environment factors.

As matter of fact, we could not take all of the meanings of what Lijphart advised us; because we still believe foreign imposed democracy has some particular characters. That is, we would say that consensus model is favoured to occupied countries, because occupation makes their societies more sharp split. The point here depends on society cleavages between those who believe in strong relation with occupier leads to independency, and between another who believe that resisting occupation will lead to independency. The result we can assume is that occupation will make more division in countries, so consensus model as Lijphart theory needs to be modified with three points.

The first modified factor is consociational model itself, which is the original theory of Lijphart. We will add favored conditions to consociational democracy in our model. This factor has 9 indicators; No majority segment, Segments equal size, Small number of segments, Small population size, External threats, Overarching loyalties, Socioeconomic equality, Geographical concentration, Accommodatory traditions (Reynolds 1996).

The second modified variable is president power; Shugart and Carey (1992) identified this important factor in determining democracy sustainability, they split this power into two powers; the first is legislative power that includes Package Veto, Partial Veto, Decree, Exclusive introduction of legislative, Budget power and Referenda. The second power is non-legislative power, which includes cabinet formation, Cabinet Dismissal, Assembly Censure, Dissolution Powers. In fact, both Shugart and Carey (1992) and Elgie (2008) confirm that semi-presidential system is more likely to breakdown when presidential power increases. By this point, as Reynolds's previous study (1996), we will add president power to our model.

The Third modified variable is occupation threat, including threat to opposite parties. We will relay on Mathewson's matrix for occupation threat (2013), in order to justify occupation-threatening

status as high/middle/ low. However, Mathewson (2013) argues that occupier state can impose democracy in foreign states successfully if there is outside threat to both, occupier and occupation state; also, when occupier provides political and economic goods to the occupation state. Indeed Mathewson (2013) and other scholars as Enterline and Grieg (2008) rank the occupation conditions and threatening environment as important factors for succeeding imposed democracy. With this point, we will add occupation threat in our model as Figure (1).

Puzzle of Palestinian legislative election 2006

Electoral system used in Palestine is mixed; it divides county in two tiers, the first is party list tier, has 50% of legislative council, 66 seats, chosen in proportion system PR in country as one district. The second has also 66 seats chosen in plurality system (First Past The Post) in 16 districts. The districts have different size started from SMD, like Jericho, to 9 seats as in Hebron. However, Palestinian election law uses "Block Vote" method in Plurality system. By this method, each electorate has votes due to districts size; in other words, if the district size is 3, each electoral must give 3 votes to 3 candidates. Indeed Block voting has some negative points, such as unequal votes depend on different size of districts, which means that some electorate has 8 or 9 votes while another has 1 vote. That Lack of justice in the equal of votes is too obvious in district level election, as it is obviously a mismatch in with the population, as Harb (2007) argues. Besides that, Block voting encourages party fragmentation; so many of parties have more tendency to defect from the party in district level to nominate themselves, when they do not get a chance to be candidate of their party (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis, 2005). That is exactly what happened in Palestinian legislative election in 2006; more than 132 candidates defected from Fateh party in district level (Yaghi and Fishman, 2006). In general, mixed electoral system has some problems and obstacles in democracy, as a candidates in all of type of plurality system almost do not need to be pass 50% to win; in Palestinian legislative election 2006; the average of votes needs to win for candidate is 42%, which puts question marks on democracy quality in that election (Shahin, 2006).

Most of the previous researches explain why Hamas got the majority of parliamentary seats because of Fateh split. More than 132 independent candidate defected from Fateh, competed against 66 official Fateh candidates in districts level (Yaghi and Fishman, 2006). In whole view, more than 400 independent candidates including Fateh and Hamas candidates competed in districts level. The Independent candidates took more than 20% of vote share in district level (Shikaki and Harb, 2007, p.326). Fateh was exhausted from them more than Hamas, in most of district level (Fruitesandvotes ,nd). In opposite, Hamas members have more

commitment to their party in election as Carey and Reynolds (2011) argue; they explain why Fateh party had weak understanding to deal with "Block Vote" system, and Fateh nominated numbers of candidates in each district more than its electoral capacity, Contrary to what it requires to the Block system. They say in this point:

Success in the Block Vote requires restraint. It requires that a party should field no more candidates in a district than can be realistically expected to win, and that the party's supporters must shun all ticket-splitting and stick exclusively with their "own" candidates. Reforms in 2006 established a parallel system that featured 66 list-PR seats alongside 66 BV seats. This time, Fatah faced a much more serious challenge from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which had developed powerful grassroots networks and proved to be much more adept in the BV contests. Hamas won 44 percent of the overall vote but took 68 percent of all BV seats, enough to give it a 57 percent majority on the PLC. (Carey and Reynolds, 2011, p.43-44)

In contrast of previous studies, Kokkali (2006) explained how Fateh lost the last election by changing supporters of small parties their votes from their preferences to Hamas, because they recognizes that their small parties has logical ability to win in district level. He argues that there is strategic voting, as he says:

Electoral tend to give their votes against Fateh ,favor to Hamas instead of giving their votes to small parties, as they believe that this small parties cannot make main changes in parties representatives in parliament ,this what happened exactly to Badel list and Third way list.(Kokkali , 2006, ¶6)

Indeed, we have two mainly comments about all of previous studies we mentioned; the first is the effect of independent candidate on district level. Indeed, we can recognize this effect of independent candidate, especially for Fateh party when they had big fragmentation as previous studies indicated. Although, we have to say that they were also independent candidates from Hamas. In this view, it is not fair to say that Fateh lost district election because of 132 defected candidate from Fateh. Firstly, we have to calculate how many independent candidates defected from Hamas parties. Secondly, we need to know how much the extent of strengthening of 132 independent candidate in Fateh parties, in order to determine how much they affected ticket splitting from Fateh supporters by their nomination in district level. In other worlds, how much they took vote share form their original party; Fateh then lead to split Fateh supporter's electoral votes, which led to loss official Fateh candidates in this contest.

The second comment about previous studies is that most of previous researches –except Kokkaki (2006) article - concentrate in their analysis in Fateh cleavage, but they do not consider Duverger law.

Even Kokkali (2006) mentions his idea without any proof. We believe that even if Fateh has weakness in district election because of numbers of defected candidates, but also there many votes are obtained by small parties supporters, so may be these votes can offset vote share taken by independent candidates, However that result needs to be discussed through investigating in the extent of implementing Duverger law.

In investigating the result of Palestinian election in 2006, we have two important comments that could explain why Hamas won majority of parliamentary seats; First comment is concerned with Duverger law. We could not observe any impact of physiological effects on electorate in district level, and that factor may be explained why Hamas won the majority of seats. In this point, we review some samples of previous studies in mixed electoral system, as Moser & Scheiner (2009); they calculate the average of disproportionality (Lsq) of 24 mixed elections, which is equal to 8.11, where it is 10 in Palestinian legislative election 2006. They also calculate the average of number of electoral parties (ENPP) is equal to 3.93, where it is too low in our case, about 2.32. Indeed this low rate for ENPP is close to plurality system more than mixed system as Lijphart's (1999) findings. However, Moser and Scheiner (2009) find the average of votes obtained by big parties in party list tier is less than plurality tier; that is close to Duverger law impact. In contrast, Palestinian election case study, where seats sharing existed for Hamas, Fateh in PR tier was 44%, 42.5% descriptive, while the same share in district level is 68%, 25.75% descriptive. If we look at vote share, we will find no effect of Duverger law obviously. Hamas, Fateh get vote share in PR tier as 44%, 41% descriptive, while they get in district level vote share as 41%, 34% descriptive. By mathematical way, we can confirm that both Fateh and Hamas lose votes in district level, in contrast to Duverger law. Hamas lost 3% in votes but, because of impact of mechanical factor of Duverger law, it got 68% of seats, in contrast, Fateh lost 7% of votes, while it got just 25.75% of seats.

Second comment relates to low rate of electoral fractionalization under second Palestinian legislative election, which it is in contrast of general theory of election. This could be explained why Hamas won majority seats. Elgie and McMenamin (2011) identify cohabitation that it is less likely to occur where there are much or small numbers of parties in parliament. Actually, this assumption is more general and it is not clear enough. We investigate 44 cases in Elgie's research, and we find most cases of cohabitation occurred in PR system (37 cases), 4 cases in mixed electoral system, in France, Lithuania, three cases in in plurality/ majority system in Mongolia. That leads us to result that there is a probability relation between PR system and cohabitation. As cohabitation's cases in Elgie and McMenamin's studies (2011), we calculate the average of disproportionality of these cases is 6.54, ENPP is 4.5, and effective number of parliamentary

parties is 3.42. As we can see, these rates are almost near to average rate in parliamentary system, which use PR.

However if that is true, it does not match with Elgie and McMenamin's assumption; that cohabitation is less likely to occur when number of parties is high or low. Our point is that in PR system number of parties is almost high, as previous studies finds (Lijphart 1999), so why did most of cases of cohabitation occur in PR system in contrast of Elgie and McMenamin's assumption. Indeed this issue needs more researches; especially that most of semi-presidential systems have PR system rather than Plurality or mixed electoral system, so it is normal to find that most cohabitation occurs in PR system.

The main point from previous analysis is electoral fragmentation. While this rate is low level, like in Plurality system, the chance for each party to get 50% is more likely, so cohabitation will be more likely to occur. That is said, cohabitation in Palestinian occurred because ENPP is low, 2.32. While small numbers of parties cannot get any seats especially in district level as it appears in Table (1), chances for both big parties to *get all* of the votes will be increased as Duverger law. In this point, we can argue that because of Duverger law exists in mixed electoral system, effective number of parliamentary parties is reduced, and that means more polarization to the big parties, so cohabitation will be more likely to occur upon to Duverger law.

By comparing results of Palestinian case study with Moser and Scheiner (2004) study and Birch (2000), as Table (1) we can easily notice ENPP in our case is less than ENPP in cohabitation periods findings in Elgie and McMenamin's study (2011), or in Moser and Scheiner (2009) study which is equal to 5.64. This confirms our result that mixed electoral system in Palestine produces party system close to

plurality system. As Birch (2000) findings, we notice Physiological effect clearly, because the average of vote sharing for big party in district level reaches to 50% , but the same average in PR list is more less than it, which is 41%. In Palestine case, most of seats were divided between Hamas and Fateh, (Just four seats to independent candidates), and both parties took less votes in district level rather than party list level, in contrast with Birch previous study.

Indeed, there are few Probabilities that may help to explain this complicated theoretical dilemma:

1- Supporters' electorate of small parties gave their votes to their preferences in district level without any consideration to Duverger law.

2- Supporters' electorate of small parties gave their votes to both Hamas and Fateh, but they gave Hamas more than Fateh because of their position against Oslo.

3- Supporters' electorate of both big parties gave some of their votes to independent candidates depends on family relations, which lead to lose both Fateh and Hamas some percentage of their votes in district level.

We will delete the first likelihood; that is why; many of small parties did not nominate any candidate in district level, because of physiological impact on party level (Third party has 1 candidate in district level. Abu Ali Mustafa list has 24 candidates, and Al Badeal has 6 in district level (Shikaki and Harb, 2007, 302-341)). Through this analysis, our model just concentrates on testing the second and third Probability, which means that there will be more likelihood to vote strategically toward opposite party from small party's supporters, with more likelihood of number of votes goes to independent candidates. The likelihood of both has the opposite of the results; the difference between the impacts of them represents the result in strategically voting attitudes.

Table 1:

Column1	Lsq	ENPP	Number of electoral parties in district level	Number of electoral parties in party list level	First big party vote share in district level	First big party vote share in party list level	Second big party vote share in district level	Second big party vote share in party list level
Moser study	8.11	5.09	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN
Sara study	UN	5.1	6.08	10.46	41.16	43.16	UN	UN
Palestine election 2006	10	2.68	2	6	68	44	25.75	42.5
D1	1.89	-2.41	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN	UN
D2	UN	-2.42	-4.08	4.46-	26.54	0.84	UN	UN

Resources:

UN; means data not available. Recourses: Moser and Ethan Scheiner (2004). Sara study data, from Birch (2000)

D1=Palestinian election indicator minus Moser indicator, D2=Palestinian election indicator minus Sara indicator

Data resourses about second Palestinian election from: Gallagher (2013)

Big party vote share in Palestenian election data from (Shikaki and Harb 2007,302-341)

New model of cohabitation in foreign imposed democracy countries:

Our new model in Figure (1) has two tied parts; the first part investigates the relation between mixed electoral system and the likelihood of cohabitation by increasing the opposing parties' chance to get more 50% of parliamentary seats. The second part

investigates the relation between cohabitation and collapse of democracy sustainability. The main factor who matches between both parts is divided society

occurred by vision/ perception towards the occupation.




Fig. 1:

The idea is that, within foreign imposed democracy countries, there will be two divided main parts in society, the first one is usually the authority representative, which has strong relation with occupation; the second part is against any relation with occupation, because it focuses to get independency, which will not be done through relation with occupation. Most social and political movements and parties in society are divided into these two parts; this division will be sharper when it is combined with culture and Ideology division. In our case we face very complicated divided countries, in which the people shape their attitudes socially and politically according to this sharp division in divided country, as Lijphart (1999) identified conceptual of divided countries.

The point here is that electorate will give their votes upon this division according to consociational democracy theory (Lijphart, 1999; Reynolds, 1996). Indeed this is the same perception of division status in Palestinian society; there are two parts, the first is religious, led by Hamas, refused Oslo agreement. The second is the secular part led by Fateh, agree with Oslo. We assume, through our model, because of high sharp division, according to Duverger law, that the voters, as supporters of small parties, give their votes to Hamas instead of Fateh in district level because of many of small parties have negative perception towards Oslo. In this view we can assume that mixed electoral system is more likely to occur cohabitation in divided society, like occupied countries, where there will be more polarization (less fragmentation) to big opposite party according to this division, which increases the likelihood of opposite party to get more than 50% from parliamentary seats.

This model explains the factors, which affect cohabitation in semi-presidential system, we assume here that cohabitation is more likely to collapse democracy in foreign imposed democracy countries if one of these following factors increase;

- 1- Majority typology of semi-presidential system.
- 2- Un-Favor conditions to consociational democracy
- 3- Power of President.
- 4- Occupation threaten, including threaten to opposing parties.

Conclusion and future studies:

This paper analyses the relationship between mixed electoral system and sustainable democracy, through cohabitation, as intervening variable. From our discussion, we find mixed electoral system encourages likelihood of cohabitation in foreign-imposed democracy, having two effects. The first one is the effect of plurality tier, which encourages more independent candidates to nominate themselves in district level, and even more, it encourages more split in party system as we can easily notice from Palestinian legislative election in 2006, particularly in Fateh case. This case affects more polarization to one of the both big parties, which increases the likelihood of cohabitation. The second effect of mixed electoral system is polarization toward big parties that depend on cleavage in society, according to group's perception toward occupation. With sharp split in society, accommodated with ideological split, we can expect more polarization to the opposite big party against Party of president that will lead to more likelihood of cohabitation.

By Our research, we find interesting result in studding Duverger law. In mixed electoral system,

we need more investigation to analyze whether there is strategically voting or not. This analysis depends on checking voting forward independent candidates and/or from small party's supporters. This procedure is not easy to follow up, but we find it is so earlier for scholar to confirm that there is no strategic voting in Palestinian election according to both Fateh and Hamas took less votes in district level than PR tier. We recommend scholars to study both of votes' direction to independent candidate, and votes' direction from small party's supporters in district level. That analysis will be so useful when scholars need to answer why Hamas won majority seats in legislative council.

The second important part in our model is consensus model, and we rely on Lijphart model in order to explain why cohabitation in nascent foreign imposed democracy countries is more likely to breakdown. Our model suggests consensus model (Typology of political system), consociationalism favored factors, President power, and occupation threat; as factors affect democracy sustainability in FIDC. That model recommend that democracy will be more sustained in FIDC, when Consociationalism is achieved in political arena, not just reconciliation. By this model, we can predict whether cohabitation status of democracy will be survived or not. We can recommend that this model is suitable also for new democracy, not just foreign imposed democracy. That recommendation will be one of the important recommendations for future studies to test this model in cohabitation periods in different countries with deleting occupation threat in this model, and that needs to be proved.

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